

Insurance Program, SCHIP. Section 301 authorizes the revisions provided that certain conditions are met, including that the legislation not result in more than \$50 billion in outlays for SCHIP over the period of fiscal years 2007 through 2012 and that the legislation not worsen the deficit over the period of the total of fiscal years 2007 through 2012 or the period of the total of fiscal years 2007 through 2017.

I find that H.R. 3963, the Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007, satisfies the conditions of the deficit-neutral reserve fund for SCHIP legislation. Therefore, pursuant to section 301, I am adjusting the aggregates in the 2008 budget resolution, as well as the allocation provided to the Senate Finance Committee.

I ask unanimous consent that the following revisions to S. Con. Res. 21 be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008—S. CON. RES. 21; FURTHER REVISIONS TO THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 301 DEFICIT-NEUTRAL RESERVE FUND FOR SCHIP LEGISLATION

[In billions of dollars]

Section 101

(1)(A) Federal Revenues:

FY 2007	1,900.340
FY 2008	2,022.051
FY 2009	2,121.498
FY 2010	2,176.932
FY 2011	2,357.661
FY 2012	2,495.039

(1)(B) Change in Federal Revenues:

FY 2007	-4.366
FY 2008	-28.745
FY 2009	14.572
FY 2010	13.211
FY 2011	-36.889
FY 2012	-102.057

(2) New Budget Authority:

FY 2007	2,371.470
FY 2008	2,505.209
FY 2009	2,523.853
FY 2010	2,579.438
FY 2011	2,697.839
FY 2012	2,735.357

(3) Budget Outlays:

FY 2007	2,294.862
FY 2008	2,469.858
FY 2009	2,570.742
FY 2010	2,607.644
FY 2011	2,703.359
FY 2012	2,716.559

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008—S. CON. RES. 21; FURTHER REVISIONS TO THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 301 DEFICIT-NEUTRAL RESERVE FUND FOR SCHIP LEGISLATION

[In millions of dollars]

Current Allocation to Senate Finance Committee

FY 2007 Budget Authority	1,011,527
FY 2007 Outlays	1,017,808
FY 2008 Budget Authority	1,078,905
FY 2008 Outlays	1,079,914
FY 2008-2012 Budget Authority	6,017,379
FY 2008-2012 Outlays	6,021,710

Adjustments

FY 2007 Budget Authority	0
FY 2007 Outlays	0
FY 2008 Budget Authority	9,332
FY 2008 Outlays	2,386
FY 2008-2012 Budget Authority	49,711
FY 2008-2012 Outlays	35,384

Revised Allocation to Senate Finance Committee

FY 2007 Budget Authority	1,011,527
FY 2007 Outlays	1,017,808
FY 2008 Budget Authority	1,088,237
FY 2008 Outlays	1,082,300
FY 2008-2012 Budget Authority	6,067,090
FY 2008-2012 Outlays	6,057,094

HONORING OUR ARMED FORCES

STAFF SERGEANT LARRY I. ROUGLE

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise in remembrance of SSG Larry I. Rougle of West Valley City. It is my privilege to speak regarding the tremendous sacrifice of this honored soldier.

On October 23, 2007, in the Kunar Province in Afghanistan, Sergeant Rougle died when his battalion encountered enemy fire. He was assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Airborne Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade. At the time of his death, he was only 25 years old. However, the sergeant had already given seven honorable years of service to the U.S. Army and been deployed on several tours of duty to Afghanistan and Iraq.

Graduating early from high school at the age of 17, Sergeant Rougle told his father that he had made the important decision to enter into military service. The sergeant's family said that he loved what he did, and that his main purpose was to help the poor people in war-torn countries.

He followed a great family military legacy. His father Ismael Rougle served in the Army for 25 years, which included a tour in Vietnam, and his son wanted to follow in his father's footsteps from a very young age. As a child, Sergeant Rougle would emulate his father by dressing up in his father's uniforms.

Sergeant Rougle was scheduled to come home for a midtour leave to celebrate his father's birthday and planned to take his 3-year-old daughter Carmin to Disneyland. By all accounts, he loved his daughter more than anything. Over the years, young Carmin will learn that her father was not just a great man—he was a hero.

It is our responsibility to never forget heroes like Sergeant Rougle. May his sacrifice always solemnly echo within us.

REQUEST FOR SEQUENTIAL REFERRAL

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a letter dated October 31, 2007, from myself and Senator SPECTER to the majority leader.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, DC, October 31, 2007.

HON. HARRY REID,
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
DEAR SENATOR REID: Pursuant to paragraph 3(b) of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress, I request that S. 2248, the

FISA Amendments Act of 2007, which was filed by the Select Committee on Intelligence on October 26, 2007, be sequentially referred to the Judiciary Committee for a period of 10 days, as calculated under S. Res. 400. The basis for this request is that the bill contains matters within the jurisdiction of the Committee.

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

PATRICK LEAHY,
Chairman.
ARLEN SPECTER,
Ranking Member.

IRAQ

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise today to call the attention of the Senate to the most-underreported story of the year: the continuing success of our troops in Iraq. In particular, I would like to call my colleagues' attention to an article by the American Enterprise Institute's Fred Kagan in this week's Weekly Standard, which articulately speaks to the magnitude of the change in direction that has taken place in Iraq.

The article reports how our soldiers and marines turned an imminent victory for al-Qaida in Iraq into a humiliating defeat for them and thereby created an opportunity for further progress not only in Iraq but also in the global struggle against terror. In the past 5 months we have seen stunning results from the Petraeus strategy: terrorist operations in and around Baghdad have dropped by 59 percent; car bomb deaths are down by 81 percent; casualties from enemy attacks dropped 77 percent; and, violence during the just-completed season of Ramadan—traditionally a peak of terrorist attacks was the lowest in 3 years.

However, Mr. President, winning a battle is not the same as winning a war. Our commanders and soldiers are continuing the fight to ensure that al-Qaida does not recover even as they turn their attention to the next battle: the fight against Shia militias sponsored by Iran.

What's more, these victories are not irreversible. Al-Qaida is a resourceful organization. If we let up, they can still recover. That is why our strategy on the ground must be based on the advice and experience of our generals and not the political necessities of the majority party here in Washington. We must resist politically-motivated maneuvering, whether it be in the form of artificial timelines for withdrawal or efforts to have politicians in Congress change the mission that has been delivering results.

I ask unanimous consent that the attached article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Weekly Standard, Nov. 5, 2007]

WINNING ONE BATTLE, FIGHTING THE NEXT:
AMERICA NEEDS TO BE HEARTENED BY OUR
SUCCESS IN IRAQ, AND SEIZE A VICTORY

(By Frederick W. Kagan)

America has won an important battle in the war on terror. We turned an imminent

victory for Al Qaeda in Iraq into a humiliating defeat for them and thereby created an opportunity for further progress not only in Iraq, but also in the global struggle. In the past five months, terrorist operations in and around Baghdad have dropped by 59 percent. Car bomb deaths are down by 81 percent. Casualties from enemy attacks dropped 77 percent. And violence during the just-completed season of Ramadan—traditionally a peak of terrorist attacks—was the lowest in three years.

Winning a battle is not the same as winning a war. Our commanders and soldiers are continuing the fight to ensure that al Qaeda does not recover even as they turn their attention to the next battle: against Shia militias sponsored by Iran. Beyond Iraq, battles in Afghanistan and elsewhere demand our attention. But let us properly take stock of what has been accomplished.

At the end of 2006, the United States was headed for defeat in Iraq. Al Qaeda and Sunni insurgent leaders proclaimed their imminent triumph. Our own intelligence analysts and commanders agreed that our previous strategies had failed. The notion that a “surge” of a few brigades and a change of mission could transform the security situation in Iraq was ridiculed. Many experts and politicians proclaimed the futility of further military effort in Iraq. Imagine if they had been headed.

Had al Qaeda been allowed to drive us from Iraq in disgrace, it would control safe havens throughout Anbar, in Baghdad, up the Tigris River valley, in Baquba, and in the “triangle of death.” Al Qaeda in Iraq had already proclaimed a puppet state, the Islamic State of Iraq, and was sending money and fighters to the international al Qaeda movement even as it was supplied with foreign suicide bombers and leaders by that movement. The boasts of Osama bin Laden that his movement had defeated the Soviet Union were silly—al Qaeda did not exist when the Soviet Union fell—but they were still a powerful recruiting tool. How much more powerful a tool would have been the actual defeat of the United States, the last remaining superpower, at the hands of Al Qaeda in Iraq? How much more dangerous would have been a terrorist movement with bases in an oil-rich Arab country at the heart of al Qaeda’s mythical “Caliphate” than al Qaeda was when based in barren, poverty-stricken Afghanistan, a country where Arabs are seen as untrustworthy outsiders?

Instead, Al Qaeda in Iraq today is broken. Individual al Qaeda cells persist, in steadily shrinking areas of the country, but they can no longer mount the sort of coherent operations across Iraq that had become the norm in 2006. The elimination of key leaders and experts has led to a significant reduction in the effectiveness of the al Qaeda bombings that do occur, hence the steady and dramatic declines in overall casualty rates.

Al Qaeda leaders seem aware of their defeat. General Ray Odierno noted in a recent briefing that some of al Qaeda’s foreign leaders have begun to flee Iraq. Documents recovered from a senior Al Qaeda in Iraq leader, Abu Usama al-Tunisi, portray a movement that has lost the initiative and is steadily losing its last places to hide. According to Brigadier General Joseph Anderson, chief of staff for the multinational coalition in Iraq, al-Tunisi wrote that “he is surrounded, communications have been cut, and he is desperate for help.”

How did we achieve this success? Before the surge began, American forces in Iraq had attempted to fight al Qaeda primarily with the sort of intelligence-driven, targeted raids that many advocates of immediate withdrawal claim they want to continue. Those efforts failed. Our skilled soldiers captured

and killed many al Qaeda leaders, including Abu Musab al Zarqawi, but the terrorists were able to replace them faster than we could kill them. Success came with a new strategy.

Al Qaeda excesses in Anbar Province and elsewhere had already begun to generate local resentment, but those local movements could not advance without our help. The takfiris—as the Iraqis call the sectarian extremists of al Qaeda—brutally murdered and tortured any local Sunni leaders who dared to speak against them, until American troops began to work to clear the terrorist strongholds in Ramadi in late 2006. But there were not enough U.S. forces in Anbar to complete even that task, let alone to protect local populations throughout the province and in the Sunni areas of Iraq. The surge of forces into Anbar and the Baghdad belts allowed American troops to complete the clearing of Ramadi and to clear Falluja and other takfiri strongholds.

The additional troops also allowed American commanders to pursue defeated al Qaeda cells and prevent them from reestablishing safe-havens. The so-called “water balloon effect,” in which terrorists were simply squeezed from one area of the country to another, did not occur in 2007 because our commanders finally had the resources to go after the terrorists wherever they fled. After the clearing of the city of Baquba this year, al Qaeda fighters attempted to flee up the Diyala River valley and take refuge in the Hamrin Ridge. Spectacular bombings in small villages in that area, including the massive devastation in the Turkmen village of Amerli, roughly 100 miles north of Baghdad, that killed hundreds, were intended to provide al Qaeda with the terror wedge it needed to gain a foothold in the area. But with American troops in hot pursuit, the terrorists had to stay on the run, breaking their movement into smaller and more disaggregated cells. The addition of more forces, the change in strategy to focus on protecting the population, both Sunni and Shia, and the planning and execution of multiple simultaneous, and sequential operations across the entire theater combined with a shift in attitudes among the Sunni population to revolutionize the situation.

Some now say that, although America’s soldiers were successful in this task, the next battle is hopeless. We cannot control the Shia militias, they say. The Iraqis will never “reconcile.” The government will not make the decisions it must make to sustain the current progress, and all will collapse. Perhaps. But those who now proclaim the hopelessness of future efforts also ridiculed the possibility of the success we have just achieved. If one predicts failure long enough, one may turn out to be right. But the credibility of the prophets of doom—those who questioned the veracity and integrity of General David Petraeus when he dared to report progress—is at a low ebb.

There is a long struggle ahead in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and elsewhere against al Qaeda and its allies in extremism. We can still lose. American forces and Afghan allies defeated al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001 as completely as we are defeating it in Iraq. But mistakes and a lack of commitment by both the United States and the NATO forces to whom we handed off responsibility have allowed a resurgence of terrorism in Afghanistan. We must not repeat that mistake in Iraq where the stakes are so much higher. America must not try to pocket the success we have achieved in Iraq and declare a premature and meaningless victory. Instead, let us be heartened by success. We have avoided for the moment a terrible danger and created a dramatic opportunity. Let’s seize it.

50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MACKINAC BRIDGE

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the State of Michigan today celebrates the 50th anniversary of the bridging of Michigan’s two peninsulas through the engineering feat known as the Mackinac Bridge. A suspension bridge spanning a 5 mile stretch of the Straits of Mackinac, the Mighty Mac or Big Mac has become an icon of Michigan.

Although dreams of connecting the Upper and Lower Peninsula by bridge began in the 1880s, it would take more than 70 years for that dream to become a reality. In the meantime, ideas for crossing the straits ranged from the improbable—a floating tunnel to the impractical—a series of bridges and causeways—to the doable—a ferry service.

In 1923, Michigan began car ferry service across the Straits of Mackinac between Mackinaw City and St. Ignace. Traffic on the car ferries became so heavy within just five years that another option—a bridge—needed to be seriously considered. The State Highway Department undertook a feasibility study that reported favorably on a bridge.

Although the need and the know-how were there, the money was not. The Mackinac Straits Bridge Authority of Michigan, established in 1934 by the State legislature, tried twice that decade to obtain Federal funds from the federal Public Works Administration but was refused. World War II stopped further progress on a bridge.

In January 1951, the Mackinac Straits Bridge Authority issued a favorable feasibility study. Legislation to finance and build the bridge passed in early 1952. The Authority was ready to offer bonds for sale by March 1953, but the money market had weakened. Later that spring, the Michigan Legislature passed a bill to pay for the annual operating and maintenance costs of the bridge from gasoline and license plate taxes. The market strengthened by the end of the year and almost \$1 billion worth of Mackinac Bridge bonds were sold.

Prentiss M. Brown, a former U.S. Senator and chairman of the board of Detroit Edison Company, served as the first chairman of the Mackinac Bridge Authority and shepherded the process of securing financing for the Mackinac Bridge. In the words of Jack Carlisle, an announcer for WWJ radio in Detroit, Brown “refused to accept defeat when it seemed inevitable. Prentiss M. Brown just wouldn’t stay licked.”

Construction of the bridge officially began on May 7 and 8, 1954, with ceremonies in St. Ignace and Mackinaw City. Designed by Dr. David B. Steinman, building the Mackinac Bridge required a complex choreography of engineering detail and construction skill as evidenced by the 4,000 engineering drawings and 85,000 blueprints. Over 11,000 people worked on the bridge including 350 engineers, 3,500 workers on site and 7,500 workers at quarries, mills, and shops elsewhere.